tion." Nevertheless, in the view of the EDU, the Europe of that time should not be isolated by its existing borders. The goal was for a greater Europe in the sense of an ideological and geopolitical homogeneity of civil democratic parties with an intended influence on opposition groupings in the communist sphere.6 The EDU was intended not only as a catch basin for the center-right parties, especially as a counterweight to the Socialist International (SI) but also as a substitute for those Christian Democratic and conservative parties that had not been accepted into the EPP as a result of their ideological or programmatic points of difference or because of their countries not being members of the EC. The ideological rifts between Christian democrats and center-right parties, especially the British conservatives and French neo-Gaullists, were in no way reconciled with the twotrack (EUCD-EDU) arrangement. The relationship between the EDU and the EUCD or the EPP-which, since the founding of the EDU, had been from time to time also designated as dualist-continued to exist. In any case, more and more European parties attempted to overcome this dilemma within the framework of the EPP as a faction in the European Parliament. The EDU acted more as a Working Group or Working Community of Conservatives and Christian-democrats than as a European Party. The EDU documented all its activities and published a regularly appearing yearbook. Starting from this background we may ask: How can we define the EDU within the context of 1989? What did it do with regard to Central Eastern Europe? What solutions did the EDU propose? What did it achieve and what could it do?
Those who are involved in evaluating the importance of EDU policy in the years and months preceding the beginning of the "annus mirabilis" in 1989 have to consider the changes in East-West policy in light of the new Soviet policy. The chronology of the "year of change"-including the period 1987/1988-represents an adequate longitudinal cross-section describing the work of the EDU, its focus, its contacts, and its expectations. After all, in 1989 the EDU was already able to look back on a ten-year development and trial period as a "Christian democratic party family."
And in contrast to the European People's Party, founded two years before the EDU in 1976, the EDU saw itself from the beginning neither as the extended arm of a military alliance nor as a strictly defined economic area. Rather, mutual cooperation and collaboration with sometimes divergent (Christian democratic and conservative) parties were at the center of its political work. This distinction would prove crucial in the "changes" during 1989.
Only the hegemony of Christian democratic and conservative parties in Western Europe made possible the increased importance of the EDU as well as the EDU member parties. If Glasnost and Perestroika had been initiated ten years earlier, socialist parties would have prevailed in the governments of most Western European countries. It was only national governmental responsibility that enabled the EDU to act as a relevant partner against the Soviets and the governments of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) countries.
Party visits by the EDU and/or EPP delegations to the same partners in the Central and Eastern European countries often followed one after the other. This race to the East was also reflected in the fact that, in the meantime, the party foundation of the US Republicans had established a political office in Poland (Warsaw) before the Adenauer Foundation in 1989.7
III. Aspects on the Leading Figures
Who were the key players in the EDU? Founded in 1978, the EDU was administered and represented by the Austrians EDU President Alois Mock and Executive Secretary Andreas Khol from Vienna's central office.8 Thus, the Austrian Christian Democratic People's Party (ÖVP) was also a leading figure within the EDU. The actual influence of Christian democratic and conservative parties, however, came from the parties' spectrum within the European Community. The two 7 See the memoirs of Dieter A. Schmidt, head of the CSU Foreign Policy Department:
" […] After the historic turnaround in 1989/90, a great number of parties from CEE pushed into the European political parties' associations. In the case of the socialists, as well as in the case of the EPP, less liberal, conservatives, greens, and communists. The motives for this were clear. It was expected that this membership would provide support and benefits in bringing the respective countries closer to the EU and the EU and their subsequent membership. The national party programs were adapted to the requirements and wishes of the EPP accordingly. If the EPP was an important and solid basis for the joint work of EP members and the EPP Group, the EDU had always seen more than the EC and the EU. That was extremely important prior to the decisive expansion moves. German parties, the CDU and CSU, the British Conservatives, and the French Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), as well as the Scandinavians Hoyres Hovedorganissasjon (Norway) and the Moderata Samlingspartiet (Sweden), formed the gravitational center of the EDU. It is no secret that the defining figure of Christian Democratic party cooperation especially within the EPP since the early 1980s was the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.9 How he was received and perceived in the EPP, whether there were critics of his assertive manner and dominant role, and in what respects he differed from his predecessors like Mariano Rumor or Leo Tindemans and successors like Jacques Santer are questions that must still be resolved through research. One expression of the leadership role of Kohl was that, for example, he was always the first to speak at the meetings of party leaders and heads of state, the EPP summits, and what he said gave the ensuing discussion its tone and direction. Thomas Jansen, EPP and EUCD General Secretary from 1983 to 1994, recalls that Kohl was usually present at the EPP meetings. The dates were initially always coordinated with him. His presence also guaranteed the participation of all the other party leaders. His assessment of the situation and his recommendations hardly ever met with resistance. He was occasionally opposed by Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers or the Chairman of the Belgian French-speaking Walloon Parti Social Chrétien (PSC), Gérard Deprez. The political weight, charisma, and the powers of argumentation in what Kohl said nevertheless regularly assured him "the broadest possible following," as Jansen recalls: "His leadership role was universally acknowledged, because his involvement was perceived as motivated by European concerns; he always spoke in the interests of the EPP." On the one hand, because of "the brusqueness he display[ed] when in a bad temper," some members felt offended by Kohl. "He made it apparent to his surroundings if he was dissatisfied with something or with someone. On the other hand, he could be very courteous and pleasant when in a good mood. The EPP Already in 1987 the negotiations had largely moved forward-not least on the personal initiative of Gorbachev. The two German states had a special role when the treaty came into effect. GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were potential target areas for a first blow and therefore particularly threatened by the rockets. Bonn and East Berlin therefore urged their respective coalition partners to give up their weapons.
But what was a feint and what was honest diplomacy? The economically disastrous situation of the Soviet Union was in essence for the reactions of the West. Thus, Soviet economic growth was supposed to be eight percent to meet the current five-year plan. In 1988 it was only two percent, which was described as "Stalinist cosmetics" by EDU founding member Franz Josef Strauß at the meeting of the EDU Steering Committee in Madrid on 15 April 1988, just as the dominant mood between cautious curiosity and pessimism, based on the experiences of the past. Most of the EDU leaders saw in Gorbachev someone who was only aiming at an improvement of the communist system, but not at fundamental change. The fact that the Soviet economy not only stagnated but also fell into ruin, that civilian research was not taking place, and that the life expectancy of the "Soviet citizens" fell significantly from the mid-1980s onward was only worked out in detail later by analysts and historians.14 Nevertheless, within the framework of its own analyses, the EDU tried to at least ask questions about the possible economic and political alternatives for the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. This was the purpose of the intensive East contacts. The EDU's strategic arm for all "European-ideological" questions was the so-called there were particularly strong doubts about the sincerity of the reform will of the Soviet leadership. From 1985 to 1989, contacts with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the purpose of an exchange of information and ideas on topical issues of international politics were not uncommon for representatives of Western countries and non-Communist parties. Most of these contacts were of an ad-hoc nature. Some of the social democratic parties in Western Europe, such as the German Social Democrats (SPD), maintained institutionalized relations.
The EDU discussed the issue of relations between EDU members and the Communist parties of Warsaw Pact countries within its Steering Committee on several occasions. In general, such relations were subject to criticism, particularly in view of the fact that the victims of human rights violations in these countries might interpret such contacts as a kind of legitimization of the Communist single-party system. No decisions were taken regarding an official EDU policy vis-à-vis Communist parties.
In 1989, the situation had changed in that relations between the EDU member parties and communist parties could no longer be considered according to the aspect of legitimization. This argument could now clearly be refuted by stating from the very beginning and in public that the issue to be discussed concern democracy, human rights and other matters, and that contacts were also to be established with opposition groups. Thus, from this point of view, there were no basic objections to informative talks and non-institutionalized contacts with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Apart from a few exceptions, this was fundamentally new both for the EDU and its member parties. A joint approach of all EDU member parties appeared to be more meaningful than bilateral partyto-party talks. A joint approach was coordinated properly from the outset, and thus, the risk of misunderstandings in bilateral contacts could be eliminated.18
Any new contacts were to demonstrate the implementation of the principle of free movement, as laid down by the Vienna Follow- The EDU could not pursue contacts in the Soviet Union, unless EDU member parties were guaranteed the right to meet any individual and any group anywhere and at any point in time.
Since its reorganization at the end of 1988, the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union acted as a general coordinating and controlling body in all international affairs, i. e. its functions were not limited to party contacts. Thus, the Department was in charge of relations with Communist parties all over the world. Institutionalized contacts with other parties as well as fundamental issues of foreign, security and foreign trade policies were also part of its responsibility.
On the one hand in the EDU meetings with Soviet representatives in May and September 1989, a strong downward trend and changing expectations were documented. As early as spring, many conservative observers questioned the irreversibility of the Soviet reform course. On the other hand, at the beginning of 1989, the Soviet leadership felt that it was enough to convince conservative circles in the West of the seriousness of the Gorbachev course to win the entire political spectrum of the West and the remaining critics and doubters on the fringes.20
Regarding the Soviet attitude towards maintaining these contacts with EDU bodies, conservative circles in the West were often also the key to economic and scientific-technological cooperation. Gorbachev had attempted to establish a good relationship with Christian Democrats and conservative politicians in the United States, including US President Ronald Reagan, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Franz Josef Strauß, the Bavarian Prime Minister until his death in 1988. 21 Thatcher, as is well known, was the first Western top politician to spontaneously declare in December 1984 on the occasion of a London visit of the then-second man in the Kremlin: "I can do business with him."22 Rightly, the Austrian EDU representatives recognized the opportunity to promote an under- Europe, 1986 Europe, -1989 standing of Austrian EC policy during these talks. At the same time, Austrians were one of the largest (external) critics of the slow-moving internal market within the framework of the EDU. From the perspective of 1988, the finalization of the Internal Market and the simultaneous creation of a larger European Economic Space (EES) merely remained a vision. On the one hand, it should be taken into account that the EDU consisted of parties that belonged to the EC, but, on the other hand, not only to the EC but also to the EFTA. Thus, East-West contacts also developed during these tensions. As early as 1988, the EDU Party Leader Conference gave a very strong recommendation to all of its member parties that it would be welcomed if individual states were to cease any contact with the Eastern Economic Organization in "the EFTA Countries and the European Community." Above all, the German and French representatives at the EDU considered it more opportune for the EC to act as the main Western negotiating partner with COMECON.23 This also resulted in the individual EFTA countries and parties that were represented in the EDU, such as Austria and Sweden, approaching the idea of full membership in the European Community. This fundamental consideration of further EC membership led Brussels itself to make additional bilateral concessions to reduce pressure on the Community. The European Union's market position was deliberately emphasized. As a result, all rapprochements within the framework of EDU integration negotiations and conferences were to be viewed exclusively from a market-economic perspective. Moreover, the discussion on market integration clearly describes the issue within the EDU on the eve of 1989. In 1988, the realization of a Western European single market was still being sought for 1992. 24 The importance of an interface between market-economic considerations (EC-EFTA negotiations) and the new foreign policy developments in the East becomes clear in the person of Bernhard Vogel. After years of no contact, the time is now ripe to hold talks with this important part of Europe. In any case, there is no longer any fear of ideological contact at all within the EDU." Valentin Falin said at the same press conference that "the conversation is not only a positive beginning to a hopefully productive collaboration, but also a symbolic sign of the profound changes in the political landscape of Europe. I emphasize the importance of human contact for the solution of common European problems, even if it is likely to take longer to understand each other beyond ideological boundaries. How does the Chinese proverb go? 'A long journey begins with the first step'." Archive of the Karl von Vogelsang-Institute, EDU Collection, press releases and press conferences, sign. JB 1988.
Security and Cooperation in
civil rights groups and later parties. In the case of the Hungarian contacts, the race with the Socialist International became clear, which in turn soon turned into a "road map" for securing a leftist partner from the party bankruptcy. However, this was linked with the risk of dealing with reformed communists who had become involved as partners. However, the divergent experiences with these countries' contacts and the pronounced visit-diplomacy also led to divergent analyses. Even in June 1989, many EDU party leaders believed in different developments in the "Eastern Bloc." There were also different moods in the populations of the respective homelands, ranging from "politically lethargic" to "euphoric." This balancing act between European responsibility and national interest was reinforced by the year 1989-and not just created. At the prominent meeting of the EDU Steering Committee in Stockholm at the end of June 1989, it was assumed that Hungary and Poland would be most likely to achieve a lasting change in their political systems, while in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans, the persistent socialist forces were viewed as reform-resistant.27
At its 37 th meeting, which was held on 10 March 1989 in Lisbon, the EDU Steering Committee decided with regard to Poland that an EDU delegation was to visit Warsaw in May 1989 , in order to analyze the political and constitutional changes after the "round table talks" between the Communist government and the representatives of new political groups. The EDU delegation was to meet with representatives of both the government and these new political groups to discuss the future political, economic, and cultural relations.28
But still, the negative voices had not declined, especially among the Scandinavian member parties, which warned against too offensive openings and reforms in individual Eastern states and as a result against a fate such as the "Prague Spring" and consequently against risky diplomatic incidents. The Executive Committee of the EDU tried to interpret the internal power shifts within the Soviet system. These included the plenum of the Central Committee and the meeting of the Supreme Soviet since November 1988. But even these observations had in the past only revealed the well-known strategic game of "doves" and "hawks" in the Kremlin. Western contacts had always failed. What was different in 1989? On 26 March, elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union took place in the Soviet Union, and it was not concealed from the West that numerous prominent party representatives were being punished, and representatives of the internal party opposition were being given consent, which had previously seemed impossible.29 
V. Poland and Hungary as priorities
Seen from this perspective, the meeting of the EDU European Committee in Budapest from 19 to 21 June 1989 was a turning point in the entire EDU policy. During these June days, the EDU, as an organization, began to realize that the political upheavals in the East were not a singular event. The fact that Alois Mock and Andreas Khol had taken key positions underlines the scope of action of the President and his Executive Secretary. While Hungary and Poland had been at the center of the observations up to then, the decision was made to send observation missions to as many Eastern and Central Eastern European countries as possible. The focus of the new EDU-Ostpolitik was to explore the extent to which reforms were occurring in the individual countries and in what ways these reforms could be supported by the EDU.30 It was the aim of the EDU missions to investigate how far the democratic reforms and transformations had already progressed, and moreover, how to support further reform steps. The Budapest meeting was organized completely by the Austrians and the ÖVP-foreign policy expert Rainer Stepan. Due to Stepan's personal contacts, the EDU was able to get in touch instantly with opposition groups.
When, in July 1989, the Hungarian opposition groups had forced elections, EDU contacts, provided by the Austrians and especially Rainer Stepan, were suitable "keys" to electing later non-communist parliamentarians. It was evident now that a large number of partners had previously failed due to lack of both suitable candidates and contacts in West. The EDU was able to achieve a "rich political harvest" in 1989.31
In Budapest, the EDU's clearly defined aim was to explore the new political structures and provide organizational and policy support to the new political forces. The EDU emphasized that discussions should now be held with all new opposition groups. In the case of the Hungarian host country, this meant, in June 1989, not only talks with the leaders of the state and the communist state party and the president of the parliament but also with the churches, ecclesiastical journalists, and the new parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Alliance The EDU understood how to predict the key economic figures as far as they were available from Eastern Europe. The true drama of the Soviet economy, which was close to insolvency, however, was not known in the summer of 1989. State and party leaders in the West knew very well that political reforms in the COMECON countries were directly related to their economic weaknesses. Consequently, Budapest's economic problems with the leading economists and economic journalists were also discussed in Budapest. In order to keep pace with the political developments, the EDU increased the number and frequency of its meetings. All information and assessments were supposed to be communicated quickly within the party platform.
But even at the thirty-eight meeting of the EDU Steering Committee in Stockholm on 30 June 1989, the "Stockholm Declaration," published afterwards, did not reveal any prospects for an impending overthrow of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe. Under the leadership of Mock, the Christian democrats expressed their support for the reductions and restructuring of Western troops in Europe, initiated at the last NATO summit with US President George Bush, as "these would be on the ongoing East-West talks Security and trust building." In the summer of 1989, the aim of EDU's East-West policy was "to achieve a stable and secure balance in Europe, with lower troop levels […] ."33
As far as contacts with the Soviet Union were concerned, future decisions were made in Stockholm. The EDU Steering Committee agreed to accept the invitation of the EDU Executive Secretariat to Moscow in the autumn to discuss political reforms in Europe, cooperation in economics and environmental protection between East and West. The EDU, through this offensive commitment to maintaining contacts, stood out from other West European party groups, that had not advanced their contacts into the "lion's den."
Still, caution and skepticism-perhaps even the thought of impossibilitylimited far-reaching changes in Eastern and Central Europe. A few days before this Stockholm Declaration, on 27 June 1989, a memorable event occurred. Mock cut through the border fence with his Hungarian colleague Gyula Horn at the Burgenland-Hungarian border. These memorable media images of cutting through the border fence made it clear to the European public in East and West that the erosion of the existing power division had become unstoppable. 34 Mock was acknowledged in the international media for his personal courage and farsightedness. The general symbolism, which Austria played in this, remained little recognized in many places however. 35 In the later memoirs of US President George Bush, Mock is not even mentioned, and even his close companion within the EDU, Helmut Kohl, did not regard this act as part of a courageous all-Austrian European policy. In the West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the cutting of the barbed wire and the Austrian attitude throughout the year were only praised as "showing solidarity and being helpful." 36 In this historic phase, the European party leaders were urgently looking for guidance, which at least enabled a "policy-based view" in the medium term. In the summer of 1989, from 24 to 26 August, an EDU parliamentary conference took place in Antalya, Turkey. The choice of topics is interesting in the middle of the "year of change." In a total of eight resolutions, the EDU parliamentarians attempted to give a direction to their own interests. 37 A few days before the EDU conference in Prague, a peaceful bourgeois demonstration memorialized the suppression of the "Prague Spring" by Warsaw Pact troops on the twenty-first anniversary. Through this demonstration-blended with the current demands of 1989, such as human rights and freedom of speech and expression-the Czechoslovak single-party state saw itself challenged in all of its own certainty. Numerous Czechoslovak and foreign demonstrators were beaten and imprisoned. In a sharp resolution, the EDU Parliamentary Conference condemned this demonstration of power in Prague. Interestingly, the Polish Parliament and individual Hungarian opposition politicians also criticized this approach.38
The second resolution was devoted to the EU membership of parties from Central and Eastern European countries and clearly defined the admission criteria ("[…] the parties must be democratic and like-minded […] must be of national importance […] must operate in a democracy or an emerging democracy"). In the summer of 1989 there was no formal membership of any party from the East, but alone that one was possible, even postulated, suggested a sensational development.
A third resolution attempted a political balancing act: The potential new members of the EDU were to be wooed, but at the same time, the EDU tried to bring them up to Western European standards. Self-reliance, individuality, financial responsibility, and the importance of the family were emphasized as cornerstones of Christian Democratic politics ("Principles of a rational policy: welfare society instead of welfare state"). The EDU leadership consciously emphasized not only individual responsibility but also the new, emerging parties at that time of development.39
Any long-term strategic planning was evidently made difficult at this stage of development, possibly even impossible. The external political situation, and the drama within the real socialist hemisphere, which occurred almost weekly, blurred the boundaries between action and reaction. This also applied to an intergovernmental grouping like the EDU. From 21-23 September 1989, the IDU party leadership conference took place in Tokyo. Within the framework of this meeting-and not to waste any time-the further course of action within the EDU was discussed. The party chairmanship commissioned the EDU Steering Committee to draw up an aid program for newly-formed democratic parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Steering Committee was also called upon to "seek ways of making contacts to such parties, including the possibility of membership or other institutional links." In Tokyo, EDU President Alois Mock presented the results of recent analyses of inner-Soviet relations. 40 The EDU office in Vienna had added four states of the "Eastern Bloc" to its political agenda: Rapid contacts were to be established, especially with 1. The Soviet Union, 2. Poland, 3. Hungary and finally 4. Slovenia, where the political changes had developed at incredible speed. The fact that the EDU cooperate directly with opposition forces in the Soviet Union and also explicitly mentioned Slovenia-instead of Yugoslavia-still appears remarkable even decades later.41
The fact that one wanted to go directly to the situation in the Soviet Union, and thus to Gorbachev, showed not so much the degree of agreement on negotiation as the mutual trust that had been expressed. The contacts of the "Vogel-Commission," which had already begun in the spring of 1989, to the official Soviet state and party apparatus as well as to the public groups continued seamlessly. In the EDU analysis of possible Christian-oriented Russian cooperation partners, there were obvious uncertainties and fundamental difficulties in transposing Western European definitions to Russian conditions. However, these EDU assessments had produced names, figures who would intervene actively in later historical events. Despite the establishment of an explicitly named "Christian Democratic Party of Russia" in the summer of 1989, the EDU leadership considered it unlikely that a real party system would develop in the near future.42
The EDU, especially Mock, paid more attention to an interregional group led collectively by Andrei Sakharov, Yuri Afanasyev, Victor Palm, former chess world champion Anatoly Karpov, and Boris Yeltsin. In the view of the EDU, this group fulfilled the function of an opposition group, although its members could not be categorized by specific political parties or ideologies. Some of them, according to EDU analyses, were described as "communists," who were not reformable. Some from this interregional group still believed in a "kind of reform communism," others were "liberal," some were considered "conservative."43
The historical assessment of the EDU mission to Moscow in early September 1989 is therefore not easy to judge. Neither can this trip be seen as generally successful or a failure. From 5 to 9 September Secretary-General Khol, Antti Peltomäki and Bernd Fischer visited the capital of the Soviet Union, not least in the hope of meeting Gorbachev. This hope finally crumbled. There was no meeting. Nevertheless, this second mission was important for the EDU Executive Secretariat in reaffirming the seriousness of the Christian-democratic commitment to the Soviet side, led once again by Falin.
In a total of three working sessions, both sides prepared a joint statement, which, however, was not supposed to be published in the Soviet media at the 41 As early as the spring of 1989, the Baltic States had become a special feature of the contacts with the Soviet Union. In the case of the Estonian SSR, the Latvian SSR, and the Lithuanian SSR (all of them struggling for independence from the Soviet Union), the uncertainty and the hesitation of the EDU was shown. These Soviet republics were in principle to be treated separately. The Baltic People's Fronts, which were founded in the first half of 1989 (considered by the EDU to be popular movements in support of Gorbachev's Perestroika), were not organized on a party basis, although they were ideologically independent and opposed to Soviet communism. As noted in the EDU Steering Committee minutes, "[…] The main intention must be to include as many democratic groups as possible. The EDU wants to keep the rules as they were originally agreed among all parties. This means the expansion of contacts or membership. There will always be discussions about these principles in the light of specific problems."45
In the case of Poland and Hungary, it was very clear that it was sometimes difficult to find bourgeois and Christian-democratic groups from the multitude of supposed opposition groups that would fit the content and structure of the Western European Christian Democrats. It was above all here that the German Chancellor and CDU chairman Helmut Kohl, who had already argued for a pragmatic approach for years, sought to promote all relevant groups evenly. Accordingly, the attempt was made to address the entire democratic party 44 Report on the EDU Secretariat's Mission to Moscow, 6-8 September 1989. " […] it had been discussed already in Stockholm, at the end of the meeting between EDU Party Leaders and leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, some sort of common declaration will have to be published. In view of experiences with Soviet negotiators, the Executive Secretary put together in advance a draft statement, on the basis of the Stockholm declaration and EDU programmatic instruments. This draft, after having been agreed to by Dr. Fischer and Mr. Peltomäki, was presented upon request to the Soviet hosts. Apparently, they could not agree amongst themselves on their text beforehand, not knowing how much to ask from the EDU […] This put the EDU delegation in the favourable position that the basis for negotiations was our draft. After a general discussion on Thursday morning, the EDU Delegation presented this draft and it was immediately well received by the Soviet hosts.
[…] The common statement is based on the Stockholm Declaration, as regards environmental protection, it is based on the EDU expertise. It should be mentioned that although the Soviets proposed to issue a communique on our visit to Moscow in the Pravda, the EDU Delegation made clear that they would prefer to have no communication to the press, and so it was agreed, our visit was not in the soviet or any other press." system equally and from the same level on the part of the Western European parties. A departure from this support policy would only take place through clear internal political shifts in these countries themselves, but, in principle, there was the distinction between contacts on the one hand and financial support on the other. From the point of view of the leading EDU member parties, one condition
was not yet the other.46 In the Steering Committee minutes, it was made clear, the "EDU supports an activist position as regards new members or contacts.
Seeking new contacts and members is essential. We share the respective financial recommendations put forward in the various reports."47
In Poland, from the summer of 1989 onwards, the lack of unity within the Christian Trade Union had become more and more pronounced. The separation between the Solidarity Trade Union movement as an electoral block and the group of (party) functionaries had also been highlighted at the EDU office in Vienna. As a result, political parties were only able to develop slowly in the autumn of 1989. Even in the middle of October, the fog had not yet lifted for the EDU because cryptically the analysts wrote that currently there were On 17 December 1989, Mock repeated the demonstrative gesture of cutting the previously insurmountable border fence, this time on the Czechoslovak border near Laa/Thaya. Now Mock's counterpart was the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiři Dienstbier, who, for his part, had urged him, like Hungary, to put an end to the deadly border in a symbolic act with his country.50
The EDU was the only Christian Democratic force to maintain contacts with opposition groups, especially in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, as early as the beginning of the 1980s. From the emergence of the Solidarność (Solidarity) in Poland in 1980, EDU was in close contact with Polish Christians. When, in Czechoslovakia, a sign-up campaign was organized for the Prague Cardinal František Tomašek in Czechoslovakia in 1986-also with the support of Charta 77-the EDU tried to provide logistical and political assistance under Mock and Stepan. After all, this democratic petition was signed by 600,000 people-well aware that it could be associated with personal reprisals.51 The third emphasis in the policy of the EDU-besides the Soviet Union and Poland-was Hungary. In comparison to the other two countries the disruption of the ruling communist system was advanced comparatively well in 1988/89 in Hungary.
As already mentioned above, the party spectrum was pluralistically developed. The efforts of Austrian politicians and human rights activists to establish contacts with dissidents in the East have already been described. The Austrian Minister of Science and later Chairman of the ÖVP, Erhard Busek and the Director of the Karl von Vogelsang-Institute-located at the Political Academy of the ÖVP-in Vienna, Rainer Stepan, were early pioneers and "scouts" for keeping in touch with civil groups in the Communist system. In the course of 1989, these From the side of the EDU, this basic attitude was expressed as a desire to join the Christian Democratic party family as soon as possible. At the initiative of Alois Mock, as well as Helmut Kohl, the Democratic Forum of the EDU Steering Committee was held from 6 to 7 December 1989. With financial support from the Hungarian parties, the EDU leadership established the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The Independent Smallholders' Party, the Christian Democratic People's Party and Fidesz, the later dominant power on the bourgeois side in Hungary, were to be supported with small financial sums.52
VI. The upcoming German Question
In the meantime, in the autumn of 1989, political developments in the GDR had become unpredictable and radically changed. Within the EDU, too, the changes of the year 1989 unleashed a dynamic, which never had happened before, and again this was within the framework of the integration process. However, the "turnaround" also made it clear that even the strongest euphoria could only cover a few expectations in the long run. In the autumn of 1989 the events were finally over. The EDU had established itself as a stage for transnational contacts, which were quite comparable to those of the institutionalized meetings within the EC.
In point, a total of 250,000 emigrants from the GDR had come to the FRG. A total of 300,000 emigrants from other countries (ethnic Germans) were also received. The big migratory movement from the GDR to the FRG was only possible in view of the opening of the Hungarian border to Austria in September 1989. This had been achieved with the help of the EDU's Chairman Mock. Bohl expressed the gratitude of the Germans to the Austrians for their assistance. The SPD was now trying to profit from the developments and attempting to show that these changes had all been due to their policies, Bohl argued. They were trying to make the public forget that they and the SED had only recently signed papers of cooperation together Social Democrats now wanted to jump on the running train and get themselves into the driver's seat of the locomotive. Nevertheless, the CDU's policy would have been decisive anyway. The West needed to be firm: "Now it is our duty to underpin the reform process through economic assistance. At the suggestion of Margaretha af Ugglas, MP, the Committee congratulated its German friends on these historical developments."53 The Committee deliberated the recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The opening of the borders of the GDR to the West was warmly welcomed as were the signs of reform in this state. The Committee especially congratulated Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his government on the developments in inner-German relations:
"The firm insistence on the Basic Law and its implication by the CDU/CSU contributed to this success just as much as their adherence to the principle, unlike the SPD, of not entering into friendly relations with the SED, the communist party, which bears the responsibility for the old regime of terror. Only a few weeks ago, the SPD was still trying to conduct top-level talks with the SED, thus stabilizing this party. The EDU welcomes and supports the courageous and far-sighted attitude of Chancellor Kohl in responding to the crisis in the GDR with a broad offer of aid, if those in power initiate a process of democratization. The Committee will support Chancellor Kohl and his government in all further steps that lead to a peaceful development as well as to more freedom and democracy in the GDR. The EDU supports the desire of the Germans to complete the unity of Germany in freedom and peace in exercising the right of self-determination."54
The EDU Committee then adopted a declaration under the heading "For a unified Europe in peace and freedom." It supported the demand of the federal government for reunification and pointed out the central role of the Western European integration process in the present changes within the Warsaw Pact.55
At a meeting of the EDU from 2 to 3 December in Salzburg, with participation of Christian Democratic politicians from eight countries of the EC, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti informed German Chancellor Kohl about the visit of the Soviet head of state Gorbachev from 28 November to 1 December 1989 in Italy. The West German irritation about Italian reservations to a possible German "reunification" began to become clearly visible.56 At this conference in Salzburg, the "German Question" was discussed for the first time by a larger circle of EDU party leaders. A few days earlier, Helmut Kohl had presented his ten-point program for a confederation of the two German states, which received no objections from the other members of the EDU, but dealing with Andreotti was most difficult on this issue. It took German policy-makers months to dispel this Italian skepticism.57
The fact that the EDU deliberately set up initiatives and statements within the scope of its meetings to present German reunification as a legitimate wish of the entire German people and, thus, also as a democratic demand for European Christian Democracy is recognizable.58 After all, since its founding in 1978, the EDU had raised German reunification to a political postulate. In its realpolitical abstractness before 1989, this goal was unreservedly supported by all EDU member parties. It is therefore all the more surprising that the German historiography has virtually stifled this EDU The year 1989, however, cannot be viewed as detached from developments in Western Europe and only reduced to events in the East. The outcome of the elections to the European Parliament in 1989 was important, and this should not be ignored for the general question of this essay.60 Notable was the low electoral participation, which was basically a disgrace for all of the participating and "European" parties. EDU member parties were not in the least exempted. The fact that the euphoria of the Central and Eastern European reform initiatives and upheavals had pushed this lack of democratic legitimacy was quietly regretted, but without any other kind of self-reflection, this was dismissed as a very early "system error" by both the EDU and the EC. This did not alter the fact that the CDU and the CSU as well as the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) had relatively successfully won these elections with their candidates. However, from the point of view of the "Year of Change 1989," the European elections showed no special thematic features. On the contrary, it was pointed out in June that questions of nuclear disarmament and foreign-policy stability, maintaining the status quo in the sense of a "balance of power" had priority over the support of Eastern reform efforts. Once again, the European elections proved to be a "protest" and it is, therefore, not surprising that the Greens as well as the right-wing parties, e.g. the German Republicans (Die Republikaner), succeeded in an above-average fashion. The main political theme of these elections to the European Parliament in 1989 was the development of the internal market and the further convergence of the EC and COMECON. The fact that the Joint Declaration, adopted on 25 June 1988, included the EFTA states as well as Malta and Turkey had been the result of EDU pre-planning.61
VII. Conclusion and Final Remarks
The year 1989 was a new beginning in many respects. This also included the fact that for the first time the EDU was able to adopt a pan-European policy, a policy which for the first time allowed freely chosen Christian Democratic parties in a previously unknown degree of freedom with parties and peoples of the East together. For the first time since 1945, Europeans were able to directly make European party politics. From then on, the EDU spoke for Christian Democratic and Conservative parties in Western and Eastern Europe. It is well known that representatives from all Yugoslav national groups and national states participated in this meeting. The tensions within the Yugoslav ethnic groups represented at this conference were also apparent to the EDU. Although it took place before other party mergers, this EDU initiative could still not alter the political and human disaster of Yugoslavia in the following year, 1991.
That the EDU, under the organizational leadership of the ÖVP, became the "stage" for the "European Round Table" on the Danube ship Mozart in January 1990, underscores this pioneering Austrian activity. For the first time since the end of World War II, Western and Eastern European Christian-democratic party representatives, along with the participation of Americans and Russians, gathered here and discussed their future together. Freedom of speech and freedom of movement as well as the emotional uptick of parties from Eastern and Western Europe were never again achieved in this form within the framework of a common party network.62
The "West" and the "East" had already recognized differences in economic policy during the irreversible developments after reunification. While the West saw new markets and areas for production in the countries of Central Europe, the Eastern European countries believed in a disinterested construction of their countries, which would soon lead them to attain the same level as Western countries. The history of most European joint venture programs proves the correctness of this misunderstanding.
An example of this is the relationship between Austria and Hungary. The role of supporter quickly changed to the role of "competitor," which did not shy away from "hostile takeovers," as seen from the Eastern perspective. The tense relationship in the field of oil processing and the wide field of the energy industry is still significant today. Nevertheless, it did not take long-an advance in time-and at the end of August 1990 "A Free Europe for All" was proclaimed at the EDU party leadership conference.63
Now, within the framework of the EDU, two Eastern and Central Eastern European like-minded parties, namely those from the Czech and Slovak Federal 62 The EDU Executive Secretary informed the EDU Committee that Austrian Deputy Prime Minister Josef Riegler had invited Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans to attend the "Round Table on Europe," to be held on 11-12 January 1990, on a ship at the Danube. EDU Party Leaders would get the respective invitations in the course of the week, and they were invited to nominate four parliamentarians for the conference. The Austrian People's Party organized this Round- The subject presented here stresses the necessity of also focusing on nongovernmental and non-state-actors and the role they played during the revolutionary events of 1989. In the sense of political-network research and networking studies, a player such as the EDU has to be considered, also to better understand the diplomatic and political decision-making process during that crucial year.
